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Introduction 
What makes us human? The definition of humans vis-a-vis other animals is the subject of 
some of the very earliest philosophical discussion (see e.g. Pellegrin 1986; Serjeantson 2000, 
179), and remains a highly sensitive topic with unavoidable social, cultural and political 
ramifications (Graves-Brown 1993; Corbey and Theunissen 1995, 235; Marks 1997; Drell 
2000; papers in Corbey and Roebroeks 2001; Proctor 2003).  
Such debates have a significant impact within archaeology. In most archaeological 
periods, it can be assumed that people in the past shared essentially the same morphological 
and physiological attributes and cognitive capacities as the archaeologist investigating them. 
While bodies differ physically and are historically and contextually situated cultural 
constructs, all humans share a number of physiological, perceptual and cognitive 
characteristics which in part structure their experience of the world, and this recognition is 
central to interpretations of the archaeological record. 
However, in the very earliest archaeological record of the Palaeolithic no such 
luxury is available, and here wider cultural notions about what make us human frame debates 
about the archaeology of human ancestors (e.g. see discussions in Landau 1984, 1992; 
Corbey and Theunissen 1995; Drell 2000; papers in Corbey and Roebroeks 2001). 
Archaeological narratives of human evolution are far from value-free, and at times can seem 
little more than ex-post-facto arguments designed to reinforce cultural assumptions about 
social, cultural and cognitive progress throughout hominin evolution. 
In contrast, it is becoming increasingly clear that different lines of evidence 
provide conflicting accounts of ‘becoming human’. For example, while palaeoanthropology 
has tended to stress the biological record of continuity between humans and other animals, 
archaeology has more usually focused on a material record which – arguably – demonstrates 
discontinuity. As a result, one of the most pressing problems of Palaeolithic archaeology is 
how we deal with multiple, overlapping definitions of humanity, and what weight we should 
give different strands of evidence in attempting to answer the question: what makes us 
‘human’?  
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BIOLOGICAL HUMANS 
Genetic definitions 
The evolutionary revolution of the last few decades has been our burgeoning understanding 
of the genetic basis of evolution and speciation. A major finding of this work has been that all 
extant humans belong to a single species, Homo sapiens, and that we are extremely closely 
related to the African apes. Indeed, we famously share almost 99% of our DNA with the 
common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) and only slightly less 
with the western and eastern gorillas (Gorilla gorilla and Gorilla berengei respectively; see 
e.g. Bradley 2008 for references). As a result, chimpanzees at least are now considered part of 
the family Hominidae (making them ‘hominids’), while humans and our ancestors since the 
last common ancestor we shared with chimpanzees are now distinguished from the other apes 
only at the tribe level, as ‘hominins’.  
As well as re-drawing our family tree, DNA sequencing allowed estimation of 
how long the genetic differences between species might have taken to accumulate. Current 
thinking is that the hominins (our own lineage) diverged from the hominid ancestors of the 
chimpanzees somewhere between 8-6 million years ago (see e.g. Bradley 2008 for review), 
and that the last (female) common ancestor of all living Homo sapiens – ‘mitochondrial Eve’ 
– lived between 280-140,000 years ago, almost certainly in sub-Saharan Africa (Cann et al. 
1987, 1994; Vigilant et al. 1991). As techniques improve, it is also increasingly becoming 
possible to identify the specific genetic changes that occur on different lineages; several 
potentially significant mutations which distinguish humans from our living and fossil 
relatives have already been identified (e.g. Green et al. 2010) and include some implicated in 
modern human language (FOXP2: e.g. Scharff and Petri 2011) and in brain development (see 
e.g. Bradley 2008; Somel et al. 2013 for review).  
Such work has already revolutionized our understanding of human evolution, and 
the potential for genetic anthropology is extremely exciting. However, it is unlikely to give us 
all the answers. DNA does not survive well in ancient fossil material, and although 
techniques continue to improve it seems likely that there will always be an upper limit to the 
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age of fossils yielding viable DNA. In any case, genetics can only ever inform on a species’ 
or individual’s genotype, i.e. on the collection of genes that make up our DNA. However, 
many different factors also play a significant role in determining how those genes are 
expressed in an individual’s phenotype or physiology during their development (Bird 2007).  
Even though only c. 1% of our genotype differs from that of the chimpanzee, 
many of these differences involve regulatory genes, which govern the ways in which other 
genes are expressed (Gilad et al. 2006; Sholtis and Noonan 2010). Even small changes in 
these parts of the genotype can have big effects, and although there are many striking 
similarities between ourselves and chimpanzees, we also differ radically in other ways, and 
some anthropologists have characterized the famous 99% figure as ‘the Great Overstatement 
of molecular anthropology’ (Marks 1997, 49). Genetics is probably not the ‘magic bullet’ that 
will tell us how we became human. 
Morphological definitions 
The most immediate evidence for the evolution of modern humans comes of course from the 
fossil record. However, the fossilization process preserves only the hard tissues – and many 
living species are difficult or impossible to differentiate from bones and teeth alone (Tattersall 
1992, 341; see also Tattersall and Mowbray 2005, 377; Robson and Wood 2008). Even 
biologists working with extant species disagree over how ‘species’ should be defined, and 
such debates become even more problematic when applied to the fossil record (see e.g. Foley 
2005; Wood and Lonergan 2008; Wood 2010 for discussion). On an evolutionary timescale, 
species are not fixed, static and discrete entities characterized by a checklist of discrete traits, 
but simply temporary configurations in a process of ongoing change, onto which the fossil 
record provides only very limited and irregular ‘snapshots’ of a continuum of variation. In 
addition, because fossil specimens are often poorly preserved and/or dated and limited in 
number, it is almost impossible to assess the level of variability within species, and thus to 
tell whether individual specimens are sufficiently different to be assigned to different species 
(Wood and Lonergan 2008, 367). Palaeoanthropologists rarely agree on how much variation 
they are prepared to accept in a species; while some prefer to minimize the number of species 
by ‘lumping’ fossil specimens together into large, variable groups, others ‘split’ fossils with 
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only slight differences into separate species (Wood and Lonergan 2008, 368). As a result, 
many palaeoanthropologists argue that the identification of every specimen to ‘species’ level 
is of less significance than the general evolutionary trends visible in the fossil record, and 
what these can tell us about how our ancestors met the challenges of daily life (Wood and 
Lonergan 2008, 355).  
Figure 1 illustrates one version of the taxonomy of our ancestors as currently 
understood, but also groups these fossils into broader ‘types’ (also known as ‘grades’ or 
‘morphs’ (following Wood e.g. 2010, 8902). This ‘lumping taxonomy’ emphasizes distinctive 
‘adaptive radiations’ of closely-related groups, each of whom pursued relatively minor 
elaborations on the same basic strategies of survival using a similar set of physiological and 
behavioural traits bequeathed them by their common ancestors. On occasion, these 
‘experiments’ in strategy, coupled with or selected for by environmental change, produced a 
more substantial departure from their ancestors’ lifeways in particular local populations. This 
in turn opened up a new range of opportunities for a new adaptive radiation of populations 
descended from this first. Over time, the different behavioural strategies adopted by local 
populations, and the selective pressures of local habitats (coupled with neutral processes such 
as genetic drift) meant that morphological and behavioural differences between local 
populations accumulated, and in the absence of substantial gene-flow between them, such 
groups eventually became genetically distinct species in the classic sense of being unable to 
interbreed (Mayr 1969). On an evolutionary timescale, however, speciation itself becomes 
almost epiphenomenal – a consequence, rather than cause, of a groups’ distinctions (Huxley 
1942, 389). 
<Figure 1> 
Crucially, however, the ‘endpoints’ of these processes are never fixed in advance. 
There was nothing inevitable about our species ‘becoming human’ – hominin evolution is not 
a corridor which chimpanzees walk into and come out of human (Tooby and Devore 1987, 
95). Our ancestors operated solely in the here-and-now, responding to the immediate 
demands of life using the physiological and behavioural characteristics they had inherited 
from previous generations. For all kinds of reasons, including blind chance, only some of 
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these lifeways – indeed, ultimately only one – proved successful, and the groups pursuing 
them survived and persisted where others died out.  
The fossil record, then, gives us an essential insight into the changing 
physiologies of our ancestors. However, for evolutionary cause, we must place these 
developments in context and examine the specific challenges our ancestors faced, and how 
they met these. 
Contexts for hominin evolution 
Rather than being essentialist, pre-given (or divinely-ordained; e.g. Linnaeus 1758) discrete 
biological categories defined by phenotype in isolation, biological species are much better 
defined by their positioning in ecological niches within broader communities of plants and 
animals (ecosystems). If an ecosystem can be thought of as providing a species’ address, its 
niche can be defined as its profession (Odum 1953), and in particular its interactions with 
other species (e.g. as prey, predator, competitor). The famous phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ 
refers not necessarily to the biggest, the fastest, the leanest or meanest, but to those that ‘fit’ 
best into their ecosystems (Gould 1998). However, such ecosystems, being dependent on 
complex combinations of climatic, geologic and topographical factors, are inherently 
unstable, with even minor changes entraining a cascade of adjustments to the new ecological 
status quo, including the biological adaptations of species.  
Furthermore, ecological interactions occur within as well as between species and 
between a species and its environment. Because conspecifics must also compete – or indeed 
cooperate – to find food, mate and reproduce, ‘social’ interactions are also a potentially very 
important selective pressure.  
As a result, species do not evolve in a simple, linear fashion, and humans are no 
exception. Rather than a succession of hominin species progressively ‘becoming human’, the 
palaeoanthropological record documents a complex, messy process in which individuals 
adapted in creative and opportunistic ways to the immediate real-world ecosystems of 
conspecifics, other plant and animal species and the physical environment in which they lived 
(Foley 1984, 5).  
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The rest of this chapter will consider how palaeoanthropologists have interpreted 
the fossil and archaeological records in their evolutionary and ecosystemic contexts, and what 
this can tell us about how we became human. 
SKILFUL APES 
Man the toolmaker? 
Although tool use has long been considered a defining characteristic of human nature, it is 
now clear that stone tools are not the earliest distinguishing markers of the hominin lineage: 
that honour goes instead to bipedalism. Even the very earliest potential hominins (Harrison 
2010) seem to have been at least partly adapted to bipedal locomotion, including 
Sahelanthropus (Brunet et al. 2002), Orrorin (Richmond and Jungers 2008) and Ardipithecus 
(White et al. 1994; Haile-Selassie et al. 2004). However, it is not until the appearance of the 
first pre-modern Homo species Homo ergaster and H. erectus around 1.8ma that our 
ancestors became fully committed to bipedalism, and debate continues over the selective 
pressures which led to the adoption of bipedalism (see Niemitz 2010 for review and 
references). Perhaps the most often-cited of these is the observation that bipedalism freed the 
hands for activities other than locomotion (e.g. Lovejoy 1981) – whether or not this was a 
significant selective pressure at the time, it certainly became significant later, becoming 
exapted for other purposes in allowing hominins to develop a strategy only partially explored 
by other primates – that of skilled manual action and tool use. 
The earliest stone tools currently known date to 2.6mya (Semaw et al. 1997), 
although cut-marks made on bone by tools have been identified much earlier (3.3mya; 
McPherron et al. 2010, though see also Domingúez-Rodrigo et al. 2010). These tools belong 
to a school of stone tool manufacture in which simple sharp flakes were detached from stone 
cobbles and used without significant modification, a ‘culture’ known as the ‘Oldowan’ after 
its first find spot, Olduvai Gorge.  
The Oldowan is traditionally associated with the Homo lineage (beginning with 
Homo habilis: hence his soubriquet ‘handyman’). However, more recently tools and bones 
bearing cut marks have been found associated with other hominins: Australopithecus garhi 
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(Asfaw 1999; Heinzelin et al. 1999) and A. afarensis (McPherron et al. 2010), and fossils of 
one of the megadont archaics Paranthropus (aka Zinjanthropus) boisei were recovered from 
the same levels as the early stone tools from Olduvai originally attributed to Homo habilis 
(Leakey 1971).  
Tool-making, then, is not unique to the genus Homo. In fact, it is not unique to 
hominins, nor even to primates. All great apes (Goodall 1986; van Schaik et al. 1996; Breuer 
et al. 2005) and many other animal species (see e.g. references in Berthelet and Chavaillon 
1993) habitually use a variety of tools. Some captive great apes have even learned to ‘knap’ 
stone and use the sharp edges of struck flakes, producing simple tools comparable to those 
used by our hominin ancestors (e.g. Wright 1972; Toth et al. 1993; Schick et al. 1999; Toth 
and Schick 2009).  
Nevertheless, archaeological stone tools remain a valuable source of evidence on 
human evolution. Not only are they the only direct evidence of hominin behaviour, but tools 
also preserve the sequence of actions used to make them – and thus potentially inform on the 
minds that organized those actions. Where the source of raw materials used to make tools can 
be identified, tools also provide evidence of hominins’ movements.  
However, a focus on stone tools inevitably gives us only a very biased picture of 
hominin technology. Some of the most ubiquitous and simple forms of human technology – 
bags and snares, clothes and containers – remain all but invisible to us, as it is only 
considerably later, and only in extraordinarily good preservational contexts, that artefacts 
made from organic materials can be identified.  
Typology and technology 
The recognition that tool use does not make our ancestors unique has led in recent years to a 
significant shift in stone tool analysis in recent years, from a focus on conceptual knowledge 
(connaissances), to a consideration instead of skill or know-how (savoir-faire) and the 
sequencing of gestures and material actions (chaînes opératoires) involved in tool 
manufacture and use (Pelegrin et al. 1988; Pelegrin 1991; see also Karlin and Julien 1994; 
Schlanger 1996 for broader discussion of the concept). Such a perspective views the complex 
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‘cultural’ typologies of stone tools which abound in Palaeolithic archaeology as of less 
evolutionary significance than the long-term trends in technology outlined in Table 1.  
<Table 1> 
Stone tool typologies of the kind drawn up for the Oldowan by Mary Leakey 
(1971) assume that a hominin knapper deliberately set out to make a specific type of tool to 
match a pre-existing cognitive concept (the mental template). However, more recent re-
evaluations have suggested that most Oldowan tools were produced in a rather ad hoc fashion 
by simply splitting open river-cobbles to produce a sharp edge (Toth 1985; see also e.g. Stout 
2005; Stout and Chaminade 2007), and that any conceptual ‘mental templates’ were very 
limited in scope (e.g. Davidson and Noble 1993; Dibble 1995; Andrefsky 2005, 196-7).  
However, although our early ancestors may not have been great designers, they do 
seem to have been accomplished crafters. Basic fracture mechanics dictates that to 
successfully detach a flake, a hammerstone must strike the ‘core’ of raw material at an angle 
of less than 90º. Indeed, modern human knappers typically work with angles of <80º, and 
these more acute angles are seen even in the earliest Oldowan assemblages (Delagnes and 
Roche 2005), but not in those produced by even the most accomplished primate knapper to 
date, the bonobo Kanzi (Toth et al. 1993; Schick et al. 1999, 822). 
Even early stone tools thus suggest that a complex understanding of fracture 
mechanics had become more adaptive for their hominin makers than among other primates. 
However, it is possible that other primates are simply less physically able at knapping stone, 
as chimpanzees’ hand and wrist anatomy is primarily adapted for knuckle-walking, making it 
difficult to achieve the combination of power and precision humans’ more mobile wrists 
allow (Marzke 1997): rather than use a hammerstone, Kanzi preferred to detach flakes by 
throwing his ‘core’ at a hard surface, giving him much less control over the knapping process 
(Boesch and Boesch 1984, 431; Toth and Schick 2009, 298). The adoption of bipedalism 
among hominins released hand and wrist anatomy from the selective pressures associated 
with locomotion, allowing for the anatomical adaptations responsible for the increased 
dexterity reflected in these early tools. 
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Stone tool manufacture and cognition 
Nevertheless, for many archaeologists it is the mode 2 technologies which succeed the 
Oldowan c. 1.6mya (Table 1) that signify a step-change in hominin technology. Bifacially 
worked Acheulean tools, known as handaxes, represent complex chaînes opératoires 
(Gowlett 1996, compare figs 16.2 and 16.3) and such high levels of finishing, symmetry and 
standardization of shape that it is often argued their hominin makers must have been working 
to genuine mental concepts of the finished product (see e.g. McPherron 2000 for discussion).  
The late Acheulean also yields some of the earliest examples of organic artefacts, 
including wooden clubs from Gesher Benot Ya’Aqov and Kalambo Falls at 780,000bp and 
400,000bp (Goren-Inbar et al. 1994), spears from Schöningen and Clacton-upon-Sea c. 
400,000bp (Thieme 2003; Oakley et al. 1977) and ‘handaxes’ made from elephant bone from 
Bilzingsleben (Bruhl 2003) and sites in Italy (see e.g. Costa 2010 for discussion). Arguably, 
however, it is not until the appearance of mode 3 technologies (Table 1) that hominins 
appreciated the different qualities of these raw materials. Mode 3 ‘prepared core’ 
technologies, as the name implies, require more complex sequences of motor actions than 
mode 2, implying more forethought and planning ability on the part of their makers (Foley 
and Lahr 1997, 9). Furthermore, many later mode 3 technologies were designed to form part 
of composite tools comprising several different kinds of raw material (e.g. stone spear-heads 
lashed to wooden shafts). Such integrative technologies involve multiple, parallel chaînes 
opératoires and require detailed knowledge of the differing properties of each material 
involved (Barham 2010, 375-6).  
The succeeding mode 4 industries are usually associated – in Europe, at least – 
with modern humans, which has perhaps coloured interpretation of the cognitive skills 
involved. Certainly the chaînes opératoires involved in prismatic blade production require 
considerable forethought and skill (compare Karlin and Julien 1994, fig 15.1 with Gowlett 
1996, figs 16.2 and 16.3). However, the argument that mode 4 marks a new, ‘volumetric’ way 
of thinking about raw material and efficiency (Binford 1973, 1979, 1989; Karlin and Julien 
1994) is less easy to support (see references in Coward and Gamble 2010, 51). 
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In any case, interpretation of the level of cognitive skill hominins were capable of 
solely from their stone tools remains highly problematic. Many factors affect the complexity 
of stone tool manufacture: for example, the nature and quality of available raw material is a 
significant constraint on the kinds of tools it is possible to make (see references in McPherron 
2000).,Stone tools are likely to provide only a minimal picture of hominin abilities. This may 
explain why the neat progressive scheme presented in Table 1 is in fact much noisier at a 
smaller scale. For example, some blade-based mode 4 technologies are thought to have been 
produced by pre-sapiens groups, for example the Châtelperronian industries apparently 
manufactured by Neanderthals in southwestern France and northern Spain. Whether 
Neanderthals developed these technologies independently (D’Errico et al. 1998; Zilhão 2001) 
or after having seen the technologies of the newly-arrived Homo sapiens (Mellars 1996a, 
415-6; 1998), the fact that they were able to replicate the tools suggests that, like 
chimpanzees, Neanderthals and indeed earlier hominin species may have been cognitively 
capable of more ‘advanced’ technologies than those they habitually relied on. Many fully 
Homo sapiens groups’ stone tool repertoires are comparable to those of modes 1 and 2, but 
these tools form part of highly complex lifeways (e.g. some Aboriginal groups in Australia 
[Mulvaney 1969; Hayden 1993]). Only by considering the tools themselves in their broader 
context of use, therefore, can we understand how and why tool behaviours were so successful 
that they became a defining trait of the hominin lineage (e.g. Gibson 1993, 263-4; Gowlett 
1996, 135).  
BIG-BRAINED APES 
Subsistence and encephalization 
Considering stone tools in their broader context points towards a significant difference 
between the lifeways of hominins and those of other primates. While chimpanzees do hunt 
and consume small animals (see e.g. McGrew 2010 for review), meat makes up a very small 
proportion of their diet (Layton and O’Hara 2010, table 5.2), and they rarely use tools during 
the capture or consumption of animal prey (though see Pruetz and Bertolani 2007). In 
contrast, even the very earliest stone tools are almost invariably found associated with animal 
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bones, some of which bear cut-marks produced by stone tools, suggesting that hominins 
habitually used stone tools to exploit carcasses.  
However, early hominins are unlikely to have been great hunters. The anatomical 
location of cut-marks suggests that hominins were probably scavenging kills made by other 
carnivores (see Klein 1999, 242-248 for discussion and references), using stone tools to reach 
the fatty and protein-rich marrow and brains other carnivores and scavengers cannot access. 
Nevertheless, animal protein probably still formed only a small proportion of early hominins’ 
diets. Because plant foods do not survive on early archaeological sites, archaeologists have a 
very biased picture of hominin diets. However, analysis of fine damage on the edges of the 
tools reveals that they were used for many different activities, including cutting meat, but also 
scraping and sawing wood, cutting grass etc. (Keeley 1980). Other potentially significant 
food resources are also accessible using stone tools, including aquatic and water-edge 
resources (Braun 2010), underground roots and tubers (Laden and Wrangham 2005) and 
termite mounds (Backwell and D’Errico 2001). 
Indeed, the fossil evidence suggests that dietary adaptations differed among 
archaic hominins. The skulls of the ‘megadont archaics’ or paranthropines (see Figure 1) 
were apparently adapted for applying considerable crushing force via extremely large 
grinding teeth, implying adaptation to diets comprising hard, tough and fibrous vegetable 
foods. Analysis of the chemical traces the paranthropines’ diets left in their bones, however, 
suggests that they actually had a very varied diet whenever possible, but that increasing 
aridity and seasonality across Africa after c. 3ma may have limited their dietary options 
(Sponheimer et al. 2006). In contrast, the megadonts’ cousins the transitional hominins Homo 
habilis and H. rudolfensis had relatively smaller molars and larger incisors, implying a more 
varied diet which may have included a more significant component of animal protein and 
which perhaps left early Homo less vulnerable to the climatic downturn. In any case, 
ultimately the less specialized morphology of the transitional hominins proved more 
successful, and the paranthropines disappear from the record after around 1.2ma. What may 
initially have been only a very minor difference in diet thus had significant ramifications. 
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Big brains and complex behaviours 
One of the most remarked-on differences between humans and other primates is the size of 
our brains: at an average of 1,200cc our brains are surpassed in gross size only by those of 
elephants and some cetacean species such as dolphins and whales. Although it is often 
assumed that the size of our brains accounts for our – self-proclaimed – intelligence, there is 
little consensus over how and why this might be the case. Some researchers do consider 
absolute brain size the key to the distinctive suite of human cognitive skills (e.g. Deaner et al. 
2007). However, H. floresiensis, with a brain the size of a modern chimpanzee (380-430cm3; 
Aiello 2010) as recently as 12,000bp, is associated with evidence for big-game hunting, 
sophisticated tool use, control of fire and sea crossings (Morwood et al. 2004), suggesting 
that factors other than gross size are important (see e.g. Conroy and Smith 2007).  
Many researchers thus favour measures of brain size which correct for the 
increased motor and sensory demands of larger bodies (such as encephalization quotient 
[EQ]; see e.g. Barton 2006 for discussion). Others emphasize instead the structural and 
organizational changes that may have occurred within the brain during hominin evolution 
(Rilling 2006; see Roth and Dicke 2005 and Sherwood et al. for discussion), although only 
very gross features of hominin brain structure can be established from moulds of their skulls 
(endocasts) with any accuracy (Holloway et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, gross brain size (Figure 2) remains significant, because the brain is 
an energetically ‘expensive’ organ which places particular strain on energy budgets. We must 
consider not simply why brains became larger, but how this was achieved. Long, slow life 
histories and ‘co-operative breeding’ (receiving help feeding and caring for offspring from 
others (e.g. the male parent or older individuals, especially older females who live longer 
post-reproductive age among humans than other primates (the ‘grandmothering’ hypothesis; 
Hawkes et al. 1998; O’Connell et al. 1999; Caspari and Lee 2004) help spread the added 
costs (Isler and van Schaik 2009).  One possibility is that extra energy became available as 
hominins incorporated foodstuffs requiring less digestive processing, such as meat, into their 
diets, and potentially also by cooking foodstuff to break down tough tissue before 
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consumption (Carmody and Wrangham 2009) – all of which allowed them to reduce the size 
and metabolic cost of their digestive system, (Aiello and Wells 2002).  
<Figure 2> 
Bigger brains also mean more difficult births, especially given the competing 
demands bipedalism places on the pelvis. To compensate for this, modern human infants are 
born at an earlier stage of their overall brain growth, and as a result a much greater proportion 
of human infants’ brain growth occurs outside the womb (Desilva and Lesnik 2006), while 
the individual is interacting with the world. This early developmental experience is hugely 
important to brain development, structuring the developing connections in the brain, and may 
perhaps have become adaptive in itself because of the extent to which it facilitates learning 
(Joffe 1997; Kaplan et al. 2000; Macdonald 2007; Grove and Coward 2008; Coward and 
Grove 2012). 
Such extended ‘human’ life histories seemingly only begin to appear among pre-
modern Homo as both body mass and brain size increase, and perhaps only became 
established among later groups such as those of Homo heidelbergensis and Homo 
neanderthalensis (Grove and Coward 2008; Robson and Wood 2008; Coward and Grove 
2012). However, they clearly build on earlier developments such as the adoption of 
bipedalism by the basal hominins, and the shift towards higher-quality resources attested to 
by the appearance of stone tools among the archaic hominins. 
Colonizing apes 
The gradual incorporation of greater proportions of animal protein into the diet may not only 
have released constraints on brain size. It may also have actively selected for larger brains via 
its impact on hominins’ ecological niches and distribution. Because higher trophic-level 
foodstuffs are much less abundantly distributed in the landscape, their consumers have larger 
geographical ranges – and foraging for more patchily distributed resources, or in more 
variable environments, may also select for ‘ecological intelligence’ and sophisticated ‘mental 
mapping’ skills (see e.g. Milton 1988; Janson and Byrne 2007 for review; though see also 
Reader and Macdonald 2003). It is notable that, while the distributions of most species are 
15 1
 
limited to specific habitats, modern humans are a global species, thriving in almost every 
terrestrial habitat known on Earth. 
Increased carnivory may thus have been a significant preadaptation for the 
expansion of hominin ranges beyond their traditional homelands in Africa. At higher 
latitudes, seasonality is more pronounced, and resources are ‘patchier’ in both space and time 
(Kelly 1983; Gamble 1993, 118). Plant foods are also much less diverse, and a preadaptation 
to meat-eating and the use of fire (although the earliest currently-known known deliberate use 
of fire dates to only 790,000kbp (Goren-Inbar et al. 2004; see Gowlett 2010 for further 
discussion) may have been what allowed hominins to reach the Caucasus by 1.7mya (Homo 
georgicus; Gabunia and Vekua 1995; Gabunia et al. 2000), Pakistan perhaps as early as 1.9 
ma (Dennell 2009, 138), the far East by 1.49ma (Homo erectus; Morwood et al. 2003), and 
northern Spain by 1.2ma (Homo antecessor; Carbonell 2008). Indeed, it seems increasingly 
likely that even earlier hominins made occasional forays out of Africa, perhaps leaving traces 
at Dmanisi (Vekua et al. 2002), Denisova (Krause et al. 2010) and on Flores in Indonesia 
(Aiello 2010; see also Dennell 2003, 2009 and Antón and Swisher 2004 for further 
discussion). However, these early ‘pioneer’ visits to northerly climes may not have been 
successful in the long term (e.g. Carbonell et al. 2010), and it is not until the environmental 
fluctuations of MIS 12 (~500,000bp), and the extinction of many of the large carnivores that 
would have provided fierce competition for animal protein (Turner 1992), that occupation of 
high-latitude regions became more widespread, this time by the later pre-moderns Homo 
heidelbergensis and (after ~300,000bp) the Neanderthals.  
These northern hominins were at the very least highly competent scavengers. 
Their handaxes and wooden spears are found associated with the butchered skeletons of large 
animals (e.g. Callow and Cornford 1986; Goren-Inbar et al. 1994; Mellars 1996a; Thieme 
1997; Roberts and Parfitt 1999), and isotopic analysis of Neanderthal skeletons from across 
northern Europe suggests that meat formed a substantial part of their diet (Fizet et al. 1995; 
Richards et al. 2000; Bocherens et al. 2001; though see also Henry, et al. 2011). While most 
of the raw material these hominins used to make tools is found very close to its source, some 
travelled up to 200km (Féblot-Augustins 1993; Féblot-Augustins 1997), suggesting range 
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sizes more like those of carnivores than primates (Gamble and Steele 1999), and the 
skeletons of both species demonstrate distinctive adaptations to long-distance movement 
(Trinkaus 1993; Trinkaus and Hilton 1996; Stringer et al. 1998; though see also Pearson 
2000). 
Nevertheless, there are arguments that even the Neanderthals were less 
‘ecologically intelligent’ than modern humans. Many modern human foraging groups 
organise their subsistence activities by logistical collecting, moving resource to people: 
individuals or small groups make logistical forays from longer-term encampments 
specifically to target specific resources whose scheduling and location is anticipated and 
planned for in advance. In contrast, it has been argued that Neanderthals were obliged to rely 
on a generalized foraging strategy, moving people to resources by decamping wholesale 
between resource-rich areas to gather and hunt opportunistically in the immediate vicinity of 
their camps (Binford 1983, 1996 [1980]; Kelly 1983). However, it is notable that many 
modern human groups also pursue generalized foraging strategies, or switch between the two 
according to the structure of their habitats (Binford 1978, 1996 [1980]; Kelly 1983), rather 
than because of any innate cognitive difference, and opinion remains divided as to how well 
these characterisations really fit Neanderthal and human subsistence strategies (see e.g. 
Peterkin 2001, 172 for review). 
Clearly a variety of energetic and ecological co-adaptations were required for 
encephalization to be so adaptive. However, these do not wholly explain why bigger brains 
proved so successful; many species without big brains are capable of complex foraging 
behaviours (Humphrey 1976; Dunbar 1998, 178; 2003). The missing parts of the puzzle lie in 
the cooperative groups and social relations which scaffolded encephalization. 
SOCIAL APES 
Group life has a number of benefits aside from co-operative breeding, including co-operative 
foraging and increased security from predation. However, group life also involves 
considerable costs – especially intra-group competition for resources and mating 
opportunities. One means of balancing these costs and benefits is to maintain smaller-scale 
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coalitions and alliances within the larger group (Dunbar 2003, 170). However, this requires 
individuals to maintain up-to-date knowledge of the ongoing soap opera of one’s own and 
others’ relationships, and the ‘Social Brain Hypothesis’ argues that while group size and 
complexity are themselves adaptive responses to ecological problems, it is primarily the 
cognitive demands of these relationships, rather than those of subsistence, technology etc. 
that drove cognitive evolution and encephalization among hominins (Dunbar 1992, 1998; 
Dunbar and Shultz 2007, 650).  
Of course, members of some other species, most notably chimpanzees, maintain 
complex social relationships (e.g. de Waal 1982). However, unlike humans, chimpanzees 
show only a limited ability to empathize, i.e. to appreciate how those other individuals’ 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings may differ from their own, and to ‘putting themselves in 
another’s shoes’, a skill known as ‘Theory of Mind’ (see e.g. Penn and Povinelli 2007; 
Premack 2007, Kaminski et al. 2008).  
Linguistic apes 
Theory of Mind is a pre-requisite for the complex metaphorical and symbolic languages 
which are perhaps the most obvious distinguishing characteristic of modern humans.  
These languages are not necessarily spoken ones: language is a system for 
representing and communicating complex concepts via a range of modalities, of which 
speech is only one, and there is some debate as to whether the two were associated from the 
first (e.g. Corballis 2010). Nevertheless, modern spoken languages and human vocal anatomy 
have clearly co-evolved (e.g. Deacon 1997), and the specialized anatomical features of the 
human vocal tract, torso and brain are commonly used as a proxy for language in the fossil 
record (Table 2). However, many of the most significant elements of human speech anatomy 
do not survive directly in the fossil record, and must be reconstructed from other lines of 
evidence. As a result, interpretations remain hotly contested (see references in Table 2). 
<Table 2> 
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Another avenue of research has focused instead on the development of higher-
level components of human language, notably symbolism. In even the most complex 
communication systems of other animals (e.g. the alarm-calls of vervet monkeys; Seyfarth et 
al. 1980), the movements and sounds which carry meaning are not symbolic – instead they 
are direct signals of the animal’s internal state (its emotion, health etc.) and/or produced only 
in the direct presence of the thing to which they refer (the referent), and are thus signs or 
indices, rather than symbols (Deacon 1997, 54-59). In contrast, the basic linguistic elements 
of modern human language – words – are true symbols in that their relationships with their 
referents are arbitrary and established only by convention (thus the word chien works as well 
as dog, ci or hund as long as everyone in the group is in agreement; Deacon 1997, 59-68; 
Saussure 2006). This arbitrariness means that words (like any symbol) can be used to refer to 
things and concepts that are distant in space and time (or, indeed, that do not exist at all, such 
as pink elephants or unicorns). 
To date, the evidence that other animal species can use symbols is limited. Captive 
primates have been able to learn the arbitrary associations between symbols such as letters, 
numbers, ideograms and Kanji characters, and their referents (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 
1994). However, their vocabularies remain small and their pronouncements limited in scope 
to very immediate requests, especially for food. Nor do chimpanzees seem able to combine 
symbols in the way characteristic of modern human languages (Matsuzawa 2010). Words, or 
symbols more generally, mean little in isolation, but combining them makes it possible to 
string together almost unlimited variations, and all human languages have grammars 
specifying how these combinations are made. In contrast, most symbol-using primates’ 
combinations show little sign of any such structure (to date, the longest phrase produced by a 
chimpanzee [Nim Chimpsky] is: “Give orange me give eat orange me eat orange give me eat 
orange give me you”; Terrace 1979; Terrace et al. 1979). 
The hierarchical nature of human syntax, in which sounds are combined into 
syllables, syllables into morphemes, morphemes into words and words into phrases and 
sentences, has led some archaeologists to argue that these grammars are extensions of more 
general systems of hierarchical combination, such as those seen in the manufacture of stone 
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tools, where gestures must be combined in specific, highly constrained ways to achieve the 
correct result. If the same cognitive skills underpin both, the development of stone tool 
technology might act as a preadaptation for language and analyses of tools provide insights 
into its evolution (see e.g. papers in Gibson and Ingold 1993; Stout and Chaminade 2012). 
However, as yet the extent to which the two might be interdependent remains unclear. 
Symbolic apes 
Nor is there any agreement on how non-linguistic symbols might be recognized in the 
archaeological record. A number of kinds of evidence have routinely been used to ‘diagnose’ 
symbolism in the archaeological record, most notably evidence of ‘art’ and burial. However, 
in many cases it can be difficult to establish whether the claimed ‘art’ work was in fact 
created by hominins, and if so, whether it was created deliberately. For example, many 
apparent ‘engravings’ or incisions made on bone, wood or stone are likely to be the product 
of natural taphomomic processes rather than calendars or musical notation (d’Errico et al. 
1998, 33; 2003, 18-19). Even if proven both anthropogenic and non-utilitarian, such 
behaviours do not necessarily demonstrate symbolism, and much otherwise suggestive pre-
human evidence has fallen foul of these stringent requirements (see e.g. d’Errico et al. 2003 
for a comprehensive review of the origins of symbolism).  
The earliest indisputable evidence for symbolic art occurs in Europe and western 
Asia after c. 45,000bp, coinciding with the arrival in these regions of modern humans, and 
this apparent association of biological and cultural novelty has fostered one-stop 
‘explanations’ positing punctuated cognitive developments such as the appearance of 
language (Mellars 1996b, 390; 2010) and fully ‘multi-modal’ cognition (Mithen 1996) – 
often via the fortuitous occurrence of an as yet unspecified genetic mutation (e.g. Klein and 
Edgar 2002; Klein 2008). 
However, Homo sapiens as a species evolved much earlier than this; our 
characteristic anatomy develops gradually among African groups of Homo heidelbergensis 
after 250,000bp (Stringer 2002), and the archaeological evidence from these early African 
sites strongly suggests that the behaviours that later burst onto the European stage as a single 
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‘package’ in fact developed in a much more piecemeal fashion over a long period (see e.g. 
McBrearty and Brooks 2000, fig. 13; Barham 2010; D’Errico et al. 1998, for review and 
references). Furthermore, insights from neuroscience strongly suggest that language, like all 
complex behaviours, is not a single, discrete capacity but the product of a network of distinct 
but highly interconnected neurological components and circuits, each with its own semi-
independent evolutionary trajectory (see e.g. Uttal 2003 for review of the evidence for 
language). To make any sense of the multiple, conflicting lines of evidence for the evolution 
of language and symbolism, we need to consider instead what it was about hominin lifeways 
that made these abilities and adaptations so useful. 
Cultural apes 
One clue lies in the observation that language is founded on much more fundamental social 
skills. Much recent research has highlighted the significance of social cognition in general, 
and Theory of Mind in particular, in providing the framework or social scaffolding (Vygotsky 
1978) by which complex skills such as language, stone tool manufacture, hunting proficiency 
etc. are acquired. 
A significant component of other species’ behaviour is also acquired socially, (see 
e.g. Whiten et al. 2007 for review), to the extent that some primates are now argued to have 
‘cultures’ comparable to humans’ (e.g. Whiten et al. 1999; van Schaik et al. 2003). However, 
while individuals of many primate species are able to emulate one another, i.e. to reproduce 
the physical effects of the actions they observe, non-human primates seem less able to 
imitate, i.e. to infer the goals and intentions of others (Tomasello 1999). This kind of 
programme-level imitation requires Theory of Mind (Frith 2008; Knoblich and Sebanz 2008), 
which is also crucial for teaching, as being able to model others’ understandings allows 
teachers to actively intervene in and correct others’ actions and behaviours, and to date, true 
teaching of this kind is only known among humans (Tomasello 1999). In addition, true 
imitation of this kind allows cumulative cultural evolution, in which successive generations 
encompass and improve on the efforts of the last (Boyd and Richerson 1996; Tomasello 
1999).  
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Mode 1 technologies do not seem to represent a significant extension of the motor 
repertoires known among primates, and arguably require only action-level emulation to 
reproduce successfully (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). However, mode 2 and subsequent 
technologies involve stages of manufacture which do not produce immediately useful flakes 
but instead prepare for later stages of manufacture, suggesting that goal-level imitation is 
necessary to learn these techniques (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008) and that some elements of 
Theory of Mind may have developed relatively early in hominin evolution. 
However, many other factors also affect cultural transmission (Shennan, this 
volume), and one alternative explanation for the persistence of relatively simple early 
material cultures is that groups were too small and too unstable, population densities too low, 
and range sizes too large (Layton and O’Hara 2010, table 5.1) to accumulate and sustain 
complex skills and knowledge systems (Cullen 1996; Shennan 2001; Powell et al. 2009; 
Premo and Hublin 2009; Premo and Kuhn 2010). In particular, symbols by definition can 
only exist as part of much wider systems of cultural conventions (Foster 1990, 519), and the 
dramatic archaeological developments of the European Upper Palaeolithic ‘Revolution’ may 
have had less to do with a dramatic leap forward in cognitive ability than with the networking 
abilities of Upper Palaeolithic populations entering increasingly inhospitable habitats (Knight 
et al. 1995; Cullen 1996a). 
Nevertheless, such ‘networking’ itself requires some quite demanding cognitive 
skills. Humans are unique among primates in their ability to maintain social relationships 
with others even during prolonged absences (Rodseth et al. 1991, 240). Modern language, 
with its multiple tenses and referencing of distant people, places and things, certainly plays a 
significant role in this (Dunbar 2003, 178; see also Mellars 1996a, 390 for discussion and 
references). However, symbolic language may be secondary here to the mnemonic and 
metaphorical role of material objects, which ‘stand in’ for and reference other people and 
relationships, allowing the ‘stretching’ of social relations over temporal and geographical 
scales greater than those encompassed by individual memory – what Gamble has called a 
‘release from proximity’ (Gamble 1996, 1998, 1999; see also Coward and Gamble 2008, 
2010). 
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Regional-scale networks constructed through material practices such as trade and 
exchange allowed groups access to alternative sets of resources such as food, raw material, 
marriage partners and new blood – crucially, it also allowed the exchange of information 
about plants, animals, environments and skills, which may have made the difference between 
life and death in increasingly unstable climatic conditions. 
When did this ‘release from proximity’ occur? One theory places it after 
74,000bp, when the eruption of Mt. Toba on Sumatra triggered a global ‘volcanic winter’ 
causing severe drought in Africa. Already widely distributed across the continent at low 
population densities, early Homo sapiens reduced in number still further as many local 
groups died out. In such circumstances, it is argued, the cognitive skills involved in 
networking became increasing adaptive (see review and references in Ambrose 1998; Jones 
2007, Williams et al. 2009; Fagan 2010, 94-7).  
However, the true impact of the Toba eruption remains the subject of fierce debate 
(e.g. Balter 2010), and others would argue that the evidence supports a longer, slower and 
more gradual mosaic evolution of these behaviours. Evidence for increasing scale of social 
networks has been identified during the initial expansion of hominins out of Africa before 
1.8ma (Gamble 1993, 169; 1999, 124), an argument that might be supported by claims that 
the Acheulean handaxe fulfils some social role relating to visual display or signalling (Kohn 
and Mithen 1999; McNabb 2007, 2012; Hodgson 2012). Indeed, even the movements of 
carefully chosen raw material, cores and ‘finished’ tools into and out of Oldowan sites (Bunn 
et al. 1980; Potts 1993; Schick and Toth 1995, 209-213; Torre et al. 2003, 204) could be 
argued to demonstrate a more developed form of material engagement than anything known 
among other primates (Coward and Gamble 2008; Coward 2010), suggesting that the abilities 
most unique to modern humans today in fact became adaptive very early in the process of 
‘becoming human’. 
CONCLUSION 
It can be easy to see hominin evolution as a succession of discrete biological ‘types’, each 
with its own distinct anatomy and behavioural repertoire. However, the process of becoming 
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human was much more dynamic than this. Our hominin ancestors did not set out to become 
human, but to do the best they could in any given situation. Sometimes they found new ways 
of doing things, as a result of externally-driven environmental changes to their worlds, or 
through their own ingenuity in interacting with the world around them and its various 
denizens. These new strategies and behaviours in turn selected for certain biological traits; 
thus, many biological adaptations we see in the fossil record were not a cause of behavioural 
innovation, but a result. 
Some of the earliest changes in lifeways dissociating the basal hominins from 
other apes involved bipedalism. Later, archaic hominins learned to strike flakes from cobbles 
to access hitherto unexploited resources, including the fatty and calorific bone marrow and 
brains left in carcasses abandoned by carnivores. It was the transitional hominins – 
succeeding, whether by luck or judgment, where the megadont archaics failed – and 
especially the early pre-moderns, who capitalised on these new skills. Their protein-rich diets 
powered expansion of their brains as part of a constellation of biological and social 
adaptations relating to changes in social life, childhood, development and growth, and 
increasing sophistication in culturally transmitted technological and subsistence practices.  
These developments allowed some groups to expand their ranges beyond African 
habitats into more seasonal environments from time to time, probably moving in and out of 
the ‘biotidal zone’ of the Near East many times before colonization of more northerly 
latitudes became more or less permanent. These were already sophisticated adaptations that 
allowed pre-moderns across Asia to survive virtually unchanged for hundreds of thousands of 
years. Meanwhile, in the westernmost parts of their range some of these hominins became 
increasingly adept tool-makers, hunters and perhaps most importantly, highly sociable, and 
thrived in even extremely demanding climatic regimes.  
This was not a straightforward, inevitable process; at many different times and in 
many different places different groups failed, moving on or dying out. Even when the diverse 
biological and behavioural adaptations popping up across Africa after 250,000 bp coalesced 
into Homo sapiens, the world-conquering finale was not inevitable. Homo sapiens is 
ultimately just ‘another unique species’ (Foley 1987). The Mt. Toba eruption may have 
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brought us to the brink of extinction. Ironically, the aftermath of this near-extinction event 
may have taught us the harsh lessons we needed to become human – and even this was not 
always enough. When the ice descended at the last glacial maximum, populations across 
northern Europe fled or died out, not returning until much later, and it remains to be seen 
whether we will be able to survive the future climatic changes we have ourselves contributed 
to.   
But what does ‘being human’ really mean? Homo sapiens has continued to evolve 
– the adoption of sedentism and domestication of plants and animals involved many 
biological, cultural, social and perhaps even cognitive changes (Larsen 1995; Watkins 2004a, 
b; Bocquet-Appel and Bar-Yosef 2008; Renfrew 2008; Coward 2010); others might point to 
the Enlightenment, or to the Industrial Revolution, as additional points of change. Even 
today, IQs continue to rise, perhaps because the kinds of intelligence these tests measure are 
more valued in contemporary western contexts (Neisser 1997; Flynn 2007), and arguments 
continue to rage over the social, cultural, biological and cognitive implications – positive or 
negative – of developments in human technology and lifeways, from junk food and video 
nasties to computer games, the internet and online social networking (e.g. Kurzweil 2006; 
Greenfield 2008). ‘Becoming human’ is not a simple, discrete event but a process which 
continues to this day: we are not yet done ‘becoming human’, and only by appreciating the 
route we have taken this far can we make decisions about where we want to go next. 
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Mode Name Description First appearance Associated with 
1 Oldowan Core and flake tools; river cobbles split 
open to produce sharp edges, battered 
‘core’ forms. 
2.6mya (but attested to 
from 3.3mya), Ethiopia 
Traditionally the transitional hominins, 
(especially H. habilis, the ‘handyman’) now 
also the archaic (afarensis/garhi)and possibly 
the archaic megadont hominins (P. robustus) 
2 Acheulean Bifacial retouch of large cutting tools 
(LCTs), especially the handaxe 
1.65mya Pre-modern Homo (especially H. erectus and 
H. heidelbergensis) 
3 Prepared 
Core 
Technology 
(PCT) 
Careful preparation of ‘tortoise’ cores to 
pre-determine the shape of the flake to be 
removed. Presumed use for hafting to 
spears. 
~300,000yrs Later pre-modern Homo in the Middle Stone 
Age of Africa; Neanderthals in the Levant and 
Europe 
4 Blade 
technology 
Prismatic blade techniques in which a 
series of long, narrow flakes (‘blades’) are 
detached around the circumference of a 
core, each new detachment using the edge 
of the previous flake scar as the central 
ridge of the next 
~70,000yrs Traditionally with Homo sapiens after 70,000 
years but several blade-based techno-cultures 
from Middle Palaeolithic contexts are known 
5 Microlithic 
technology 
Blades produced as above ‘snapped’ into 
small, standardised trapeze shapes for use 
as armatures in composite technologies 
~18,000 (a gradual 
reduction in size over 
time accelerated 
following the last 
glacial maximum 
~18,000 yrs bp) 
Modern Homo sapiens 
6 Ground 
stone 
Heady stone pieces such as axeheads 
laboriously ground smooth 
 Modern Homo sapiens 
Table 1. Technological ‘modes’ of stone tool manufacture (after Clark 1968; Foley 1997; Geneste 2010). Each successive mode 
adds to, rather than replaces, the preceding. Note that modes 5 and 6, microlithic and ground stone technologies, appear after 
modern humans and are not therefore considered in depth here. 
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Factor Key contributors Theoretical position 
Brain – size of neocortex 
and subdivisions 
Dunbar 1996 Brain (neocortex) size and group size closely correlated among primates; 
measures of fossil hominins’ brain size suggest group sizes significantly 
above the level of living primates from H. erectus/ergaster. Living primates 
sustain social relations by grooming, but time constraints made this 
impracticable for modern humans, who use vocal language as amore time- 
and energy-efficient means of group bonding. Thus increasing 
encephalization of fossil hominins is a good measure of the extent to which 
vocal language had supplemented gestural strategies during hominin 
evolution. 
Brain – laterality Steele 1998, 2000 Human morphological brain asymmetries are conserved hominoid features, 
but human function asymmetries are derived and may relate to selection for 
lateralized speech processing. Skeletal adaptations to loading have been 
argued to suggest an emergence of predominant right-handedness in Homo 
ergaster, and it is clearly present among Neanderthals.  
Brain – cranial motor 
nerves 
Kay et al. 1998; 
Degusta et al. 1999  
Humans have relatively enlarged hypoglossal nerves (as indicated by the size 
of the hypoglossal canal), suggesting denser motor innervation of the tongue 
as a speech adaptation, and this enlargement is seen first in Neanderthals and 
pre-modern Homo  
 Jungers et al. 2003 Corrected for the size of the oral cavity, the hypoglossal nerve of humans is 
not enlarged relative to those of other apes 
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 Coward 1999 Humans have a relatively marked enlargement of the mandibular branch of 
the trigeminal nerve, but not of the facial nerve (as indicated respectively by 
the sizes of the foramen ovale and of the stylomastoid foramen), suggesting 
denser motor innervation of the muscles of mastication as a speech 
adaptation. Traits not yet examined in fossil material. 
Oral cavity Duchin 1990 Chimpanzees cannot articulate because their tongues cannot reach target areas 
in the oral cavity due to the inclination angles of muscles; however, pre-
modern Homo (H. erectus and Neanderthals) have relatively similar oral 
cavity morphology to modern humans 
Supra-laryngeal vocal tract 
– larynx 
Lieberman, P. 1984 
Lieberman, P. et al. 
1992 
The distinctively human lowered larynx creates a pharyngeal cavity that is 
separate from the buccal cavity (the oral cavity is bounded on the sides by the 
cheeks); this configuration permits the production of a greater range of vowel 
sounds (and thus greater generativity in phonological elements of the speech 
signal). Basicranial flexion is a hard tissue marker of this trait, and is not yet 
established in Neanderthals 
 Houghton 1993 
Arensburg 1994 
No reason to suppose on the basis of head and neck morphology that 
Neanderthals had any less linguistic capability than modern humans 
 Boë et al. 2002 Study of the morphological and acoustic properties of the Neanderthal vocal 
tract suggests there was no morphological reason why they should not have 
been able to pronounce all vowel sounds as modern humans do 
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 Kandler & Martelli 
in prep.; Martelli et 
al. submitted 
Humans and Neanderthals share some derived characteristics of the hyoid 
bone and hence potentially of laryngeal anatomy, although there may still 
have been some differences in their pronunciation of different vocal sounds 
Supra-laryngeal vocal tract 
– hyoid 
Lieberman, P. 1994; 
Lieberman, D. E. et 
al. 1998 
Analysis of the Kebara hyoid (Neanderthal) cannot be used to reconstruct the 
fossil’s supralaryngeal airway; variations in cranial base flexion do not predict 
hyoid position in humans or other primates 
 Houghton 1993; 
Arensburg 1994 
Kebara hyoid metrically and morphologically within the rand of variation of 
all recent humans; muscular imprints indicative of the positions of the hyoid 
bone in relation to the mandible confirmed a low position for the Neanderthal 
laryngeal vocal tract as among humans, but there is no agreement whether 
this implies limited speech capabilities for Neanderthals 
Pulmonary function Maclarnon & 
Hewitt 1999 
Modern humans and Neanderthals have an expanded thoracic vertebral canal 
compared with australopithecines and Homo ergaster, suggesting selection 
for enhanced control of breathing in speech 
Table 2. Anatomical markers for the evolution of speech and by extension language (amended from Buckley & Steele 2002, table 
4) 
 
 
Homo sapiens   
                                     Homo neanderthalensis   
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Homo heidelbergensis   
                                     Homo antecessor   
                                     Homo erectus   
                                     Homo ergaster   
                                     Homo floresiensis   
                                     Homo rudolfensis   
                                     Homo habilis   
                                       Paranthropus boisei 
                                       Paranthropus aethiopicus 
                                       Australopithecus garhi 
                                       Australopithecus africanus 
                                       Australopithecus bahrelghazali 
                                       Kenyanthropus platyops 
                                       Australopithecus afarensis 
                                       Australopithecus anamensis 
                                     Australopithecus sediba   
                                       Ardipithecus ramidus 
                                       Ardipithecus kadabba 
                                       Orrorin tugenensis 
                                       Sahelanthropus tchadensis 
                                                                          7    6    5    4    3    2    1    0 
 
     ‘Lumping’ taxonomy:      
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         Basal hominins     Transitional hominins 
                                              Archaic hominins     Pre-modern Homo 
                                              Megadont archaic hominins     Humans 
 
Figure 1. Summary of hominin fossil species and grades known to date (after Wood 2010; Berger et al. 2010; Carbonell et al. 
2008). 
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Figure 2. Cranial capacity of fossil hominins over time (data from de Miguel & Henneberg 2001, with additions from Berger et al. 
2010 and Carbonell et al. 2008) 
 
